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CROWDFUNDING CIVIL JUSTICE 
RONEN PERRY* 
Abstract: The Article provides a systematic law and economics analysis of civil 
litigation crowdfunding. It first distinguishes between investment-based and non-
investment-based crowdfunding models. Investment-based litigation crowdfunding 
is generally a welcome phenomenon, because it enables parties to pursue meritori-
ous claims and defenses without generating a significant risk of frivolous litigation. 
Thus, it should be minimally regulated by securing disclosure of relevant infor-
mation to potential investors. Non-investment-based crowdfunding of process costs 
should be subject to professional vetting, which will inhibit frivolous claims and 
defenses that waste scarce administrative resources and do not further the underly-
ing goals of civil law. Non-investment-based crowdfunding of outcome costs 
should be prohibited when it undermines the primary objectives of substantive law. 
INTRODUCTION 
In June 2017, Maajid Nawaz, the chairperson of a London-based think 
tank, launched an independent campaign for crowdfunding a defamation action 
against an American nonprofit legal advocacy organization that had published 
his name on a list of “anti-Muslim extremists.”1 In the same month, Andy 
Wightman, a Member of the Scottish Parliament, raised over £60,000 through 
a British crowdfunding website to fight a defamation action brought by a wild-
life protection organization over his blog posts about the plaintiff’s practices.2 
Wightman has pledged to reimburse contributors pro rata if the defense suc-
ceeds and he recovers his legal expenses. At approximately the same time, Igal 
Sarna, a journalist held liable for defamation in a Facebook post scorning Is-
                                                                                                                           
 © 2018, Ronen Perry. All rights reserved. 
 * Professor of Law and Director, Aptowitzer Center for the Study of Risk, Liability, and Insur-
ance, University of Haifa. I am grateful to participants in faculty workshops at the IDC Law School 
and at the UPF Faculty of Law for valuable comments on earlier drafts, and indebted to Daphna Perry, 
who painstakingly read the first draft and assumed more than her fair share of the burden at home in 
order to enable timely submission of this paper. 
 1 Donate to Help Maajid Take on the SPLC, QUILLIAM, https://www.quilliaminternational.com/
shop/donate/donate-to-help-maajid-take-on-the-splc/ [https://perma.cc/S9JQ-9TRK]; Thomas Chatter-
ton Williams, Maajid Nawaz’s Radical Ambition, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/03/28/magazine/can-a-former-islamist-make-it-cool-to-be-moderate.html. 
 2 Andy Wightman, Legal Costs of Defending Defamation Action, CROWDFUNDER, http://www.
crowdfunder.co.uk/awdefamation [https://perma.cc/7CCM-BJP5]; see also Defamation Case Against 
MSP Andy Wightman Begins, BBC (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-
politics-39721538 [https://perma.cc/RNG5-MV6Q]. 
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raeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his wife,3 raised over $45,000 
through an Israeli crowdfunding website to cover his liability.4 Sarna obliged 
to donate any excess funding and any sums reimbursed on appeal to the Asso-
ciation for Civil Rights.5 These three cases—each arising in a different juris-
diction and concerning a different cost—reflect an evolving global trend that 
may revolutionize the civil process. 
Commercial third-party litigation funding (hereinafter “TPF”) has been 
around for decades.6 Crowdfunding, which is based on the aggregation of nu-
                                                                                                                           
 3 File No. 56211-03-16 Magistrate Court (Tel Aviv), Netanyahu v. Sarna (June 11, 2017) 40–50 
(Isr.) [Nevo] (Ronen Perry trans.). 
 4 Igal Sarna, Fighting the SLAPP Together, GIVEBACK, https://www.giveback.co.il/project.aspx?
id=767 [https://perma.cc/QQY5-A5JU] (Ronen Perry trans.); see Nati Tucker, Found Guilty of Libel 
for Facebook Post About Netanyahu, Crowdfunding Campaign Helps Cover Journalist’s Costs, 
HAARETZ (June 20, 2017), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.796804 [https://perma.cc/7MPP-
UP4P]. 
 5 Tucker, supra note 4. 
 6 This topic is highly researched. See, e.g., David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for 
Justice: A First Empirical Look at Third Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075 (2013) 
(discussing the effects of TPF); Ronen Avraham & Abraham Wickelgren, Third-Party Litigation 
Funding—A Signaling Model, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 233 (2014) (same); Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation 
Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. 
REV. 83 (2008) (same); Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical 
Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615 (2007) (discussing TPF in general); Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Fi-
nance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65 (2010) (same); Tara E. Nauful, 
Third-Party Litigation Financing: Do We Need It? Is It Worth the Risks?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 
2016, at 16 (same); Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 
56 MERCER L. REV. 649 (2005) (same); Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Fi-
nancing on Transnational Litigation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 159 (2011) (same); Paul H. Rubin, 
Third-Party Financing of Litigation, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 673 (2011) (same); Anthony J. Sebok, The 
Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 139 (2011) (same); Yifat Shaltiel & John Cofresi, Litigation 
Lending for Personal Needs Act: A Regulatory Framework to Legitimatize Third Party Litigation 
Finance, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 347 (2004) (proposing a statute to regulate litigation funding 
for individual consumers); Victoria A. Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding Regu-
lation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (2015) (examining responses to the TPF industry); Maya Steinitz, 
Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011) (detail-
ing TPF generally); George Steven Swan, The Economics of Usury and the Litigation Funding Indus-
try: Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 753 (2003) (same); 
Willem H. van Boom, Litigation Costs and Third-Party Funding, in LITIGATION, COSTS, FUNDING 
AND BEHAVIOUR 5 (Willem H. van Boom ed., 2017) (discussing TPF in general); Cento Veljanovski, 
Third Party Litigation Funding in Europe, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 405 (2012) (exploring TPF from an 
international perspective); Courtney R. Barksdale, Note, All That Glitters Isn’t Gold: Analyzing the 
Costs and Benefits of Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707 (2007) (detailing TPF generally); Nicho-
las Beydler, Comment, Risky Business: Examining Approaches to Regulating Consumer Litigation 
Funding, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1159 (2012) (same); Nicholas Dietsch, Note, Litigation Financing in the 
US, the UK, and Australia: How the Industry Has Evolved in Three Countries, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 687 
(2011) (exploring TPF from an international perspective); Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Pro-
gress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571 (2010) (discussing TPF in 
general); Mariel Rodak, Comment, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the Litigation 
Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2006) (same). 
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merous but modest individual contributions through specialized online plat-
forms,7 is a relatively new finance method. Yet the dramatic growth of the 
crowdfunding industry in recent years, reaching $34.5 billion in the United 
States alone in 2016,8 was unlikely to leave the civil litigation market unaffect-
ed. In the last few years, crowdfunding has begun its incursion into this arena. 
This Article is the first to provide a systematic law and economics analy-
sis of civil litigation crowdfunding.9 It argues, first, that the distinction be-
tween investment-based and non-investment-based crowdfunding models is 
crucial.10 In non-investment-based models, contributors expect only a non-
monetary benefit (reward-based crowdfunding) or none at all (donation-based 
crowdfunding).11 In investment-based models, contributors expect financial 
return—a share in the fundraiser’s future gain (equity-crowdfunding)12 or re-
payment of the contribution with interest (debt-crowdfunding).13 The Article 
contends that investment-based litigation crowdfunding is generally a welcome 
phenomenon, because it enables parties to pursue meritorious claims and de-
fenses without generating a significant risk of frivolous litigation. Thus, it 
should be minimally regulated by securing disclosure of relevant information 
to potential investors.14 
Non-investment-based litigation crowdfunding should be more con-
strained. The analysis requires a second fundamental distinction between pro-
                                                                                                                           
 7 Manuel A. Gómez, Crowdfunded Justice: On the Potential Benefits and Challenges of Crowd-
funding as a Litigation Financing Tool, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 307, 310, 313, 322 (2015) (defining crowd-
funding); Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. BUS. VENTUR-
ING 1, 2 (2014) (same); Michael Elliott, Comment, Trial by Social-Media: The Rise of Litigation 
Crowdfunding, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 529, 529 (2016) (same). 
 8 TANIA ZIEGLER ET AL., THE AMERICAS ALTERNATIVE FINANCE INDUSTRY REPORT: HITTING 
STRIDE 26–27 (2017), https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/research/centres/alternative-
finance/downloads/2017-06-americas-alternative-finance-industry-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BW2C-KY76]. 
 9 Only one law review article and one student comment have been published on this topic so far. 
Gómez, supra note 7; Elliott, supra note 7. Neither identifies the normative significance of the distinc-
tions between investment and non-investment-based crowdfunding, between process and outcome 
costs, and between financing claims and defenses. See generally Gómez, supra note 7; Elliott, supra 
note 7. 
 10 See ZIEGLER ET AL, supra note 8, at 22 (offering this conceptual distinction). 
 11 See Gómez, supra note 7, at 309–10, 322 (discussing non-investment-based crowdfunding 
models ); Nauful, supra note 6, at 17 (same); Ross S. Weinstein, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and 
Abroad: What to Expect When You’re Expecting, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 427 passim (2013) (same); 
Elliott, supra note 7, at 529, 531–32 (same). 
 12 See Peter C. Sumners, Crowdfunding America’s Small Businesses After the Jobs Act of 2012, 
32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 38, 42 (2012) (discussing equity crowdfunding); see also Gómez, supra 
note 7, at 313 (same); Elliott, supra note 7, at 522–23, 529 (same). 
 13 See Gómez, supra note 6, at 313, 324–25 (defining debt crowdfunding); Elliott, supra note 7, at 
529, 532–33 (same). 
 14 See infra notes 117–187 and accompanying text. 
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cess costs and outcome costs. Process costs are any outlays incurred by either 
party in relation to the dispute resolution process and prior to its conclusion. 
These may include court charges, attorneys’ fees, witnesses’ and experts’ ex-
penditures and remuneration, etc.15 In cases of incapacitating injury, process 
costs may include the claimant’s living expenses throughout the process. Out-
come costs are the amounts payable under the settlement or the judgment. This 
Article contends that non-investment-based crowdfunding of process costs 
should be subject to professional vetting. This vetting will inhibit frivolous 
claims and defenses that waste scarce administrative resources and do not fur-
ther the underlying goals of civil law. Non-investment-based crowdfunding of 
outcome costs should be prohibited when it undermines the primary objectives 
of substantive law. 
The Article unfolds in three parts. Part I discusses the evolution of litiga-
tion crowdfunding. It first explains the need that litigation funding models 
were developed to meet. Next, it shows how this need was met through tradi-
tional financing methods, collectively known as third-party litigation funding; 
how technology enabled alternative finance methods to emerge and gather 
pace; and how these two global trends have combined to form a new subindus-
try: civil litigation crowdfunding. Part I also presents possible legal obstacles 
to this development. Part II analyzes investment-based crowdfunding of claims 
and defenses, showing that they offer considerable benefits and only raise easi-
ly manageable problems. Part III turns to non-investment-based models, assert-
ing that crowdfunding process costs must be subject to professional vetting, 
and that crowdfunding outcome costs should be prohibited, at least under some 
circumstances. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF LITIGATION CROWDFUNDING 
A. The Underlying Need 
Civil litigation is costly. Litigants incur court charges, attorneys’ fees, 
witnesses’ and experts’ expenditures and remuneration, opportunity costs, and 
intangible harms.16 These costs impact the tendency to sue, and might inhibit 
access to justice when: (1) they exceed the claimant’s expected benefit from 
litigation; (2) the victim does not have sufficient resources; or (3) the victim is 
unwilling to bear the costs due to risk-aversion and the uncertainties of the 
process. 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Christopher Hodges et al., The Oxford Study on Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation, in 
THE COSTS AND FUNDING OF CIVIL LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 12 (Christopher 
Hodges et al. eds., 2010) (itemizing litigation costs). 
 16 See id. 
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Assume p denotes the plaintiff’s probability of success, d the extent of 
damages in case of success, cp the plaintiff’s litigation costs, and cd the defend-
ant’s litigation costs. In jurisdictions where each party must bear his or her 
own legal costs, most notably the United States,17 the potential plaintiff will 
not bring an action if p×d<cp.
18 In jurisdictions where the loser reimburses the 
winner for reasonable costs, most notably the United Kingdom,19 the potential 
plaintiff will not bring an action if p×d<(cp+cd)(1−p). In jurisdictions that al-
low reimbursement but compute the costs by reference to tariffs or a percent-
age of the claim (such as Germany20) or allow only modest reimbursement 
(such as France21) the incentive would be somewhat different. Law and eco-
nomics literature shows that a shift from the American rule to the English rule 
(or vice versa) may have conflicting effects on the likelihood of bringing an 
action, so it is impossible to predict the overall impact of such a change on the 
probability of litigation.22 
In all systems, both the probability of success, presumably correlated with 
merit, and the claim-value, which is uncorrelated with merit, affect the likeli-
hood of a legal action.23 On the one hand, litigation costs deter frivolous and 
meritless claims. If a plaintiff’s litigation costs were zero, there would be no 
incentive to avoid undeserving claims.24 The higher the costs, the greater their 
screening effect; a person whose potential claim is sufficiently weak will be 
unwilling to bear the costs of pursuing it. On the other hand, some victims, 
particularly individuals (as opposed to corporations), may be unable or unwill-
ing to bear the costs of litigating meritorious claims. Even if p×d is greater 
than cp, the victim might not have sufficient resources to bear cp, at least during 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (“In the United 
States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the 
loser.”). 
 18 The victim may bring an action even if p×d<cp where the defendant’s litigation costs exceed 
his or her cost of settling. Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success 
of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 passim (1996). 
 19 See Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 44–47 (1984) (discussing the English rule to computing legal costs); Thomas 
D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Pressure on Foreign Attorney-Fee Paradigms from Class Actions, 13 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 125, 128 (2003) (same). 
 20 See Burkhard Hess & Rudolf Hübner, Germany, in THE COSTS AND FUNDING OF CIVIL LITI-
GATION, supra note 15, at 349, 351, 365 (discussing the German law approach to legal costs). 
 21 See van Boom, supra note 6, at 8 (discussing the French law approach to legal costs). 
 22 See Louis T. Visscher & Tom Schepens, A Law and Economics Approach to Cost Shifting, Fee 
Arrangements and Legal Expense Insurance, in NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
EUROPE 7, 12–13 (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2005) (reviewing the literature). 
 23 Id. at 14 (“[T]here is a critical probability of success and a critical value of the claim below 
which the plaintiff will not sue.”). 
 24 In a “loser pays” system, litigation costs include the opponent’s expected costs. See Pfen-
nigstorf, supra note 19, at 44–47. 
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the process, or may hesitate to bear these costs due to risk-aversion. Thus, liti-
gation costs might inhibit access to justice. Naturally, the English cost-shifting 
rule fares better than the American rule in incentivizing meritorious claims 
(where (cp+cd)(1−p)<cp) and discouraging non-meritorious claims (where 
(cp+cd)(1−p)>cp).
25 But the risk of failure and, more importantly, the need to 
bear significant costs during the process, might discourage meritorious claims 
under all regimes.26 
Different methods for alleviating the economic burdens of civil litigation 
have been devised and contemplated. Following World War II, European gov-
ernments developed mechanisms for enhancing access to civil justice, dove-
tailing markets for legal services with public funding.27 The climbing costs of 
legal aid systems have led to severe cuts in public funding, making private fi-
nancing of civil litigation a more attractive option to policy and lawmakers.28  
One market-based method is assignment (or sale) of the victim’s cause of 
action, transferring to a third-party all handling costs along with any expected 
benefit for a contractual consideration.29 In many Western jurisdictions, such 
as Germany, this is permitted and quite common. In others, such as England, 
assignment is prohibited, at least with respect to some types of tort claims.30 In 
the United States, personal injury claims are generally unassignable,31 and 
many states also prohibit assignment of rights of action for legal malpractice32 
and fraud.33 A second market-based method is an ordinary loan for the duration 
of the legal process. In this arrangement, the lender does not directly cover the 
costs of litigation, and does not acquire or share in any benefit arising there-
from. Rather it bears the risk of the borrower’s default, a risk that may increase 
if he or she fails in court. Such loans are very risky and therefore rare.34 A third 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See id. 
 26 Id. at 77 (arguing that litigation costs may deter claimants even under the English rule); Edward 
A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts 
Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345 passim (1990) (providing empirical evidence). 
 27 van Boom, supra note 6, at 5. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See Sebok, supra note 6, at 72 (discussing assignment of claims); Shannon, supra note 6, at 
871 (same). 
 30 Simpson v. Norfolk & Norwich Univ. Hosp. NHS Trust [2011] EWCA (Civ) 1149, [15] (UK). 
Acquiring a limited interest in a claim is legitimate and valid. Id. 
 31 See Sebok, supra note 6, at 62, 74–75 (2011) (“The most important current limitation, univer-
sally enforced except in Texas, and to a lesser extent Mississippi, prohibits the assignment of causes 
of action for personal injuries.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 32 See, e.g., MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickles, 497 S.E.2d 331, 333 (Va. 1998) (“The common law of 
this Commonwealth did not permit the assignment of legal malpractice claims.”); Sebok, supra note 6, 
at 85 (discussing legal malpractice). 
 33 See Sebok, supra note 6, at 88 (discussing rights of action for fraud). 
 34 See Richmond, supra note 6, at 650 (“[M]ost traditional lenders are unwilling to lend money 
with only a potential litigation recovery as collateral because such loans are deemed to be too risky.”). 
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market-based method is legal expenses insurance. Insurance reduces the likeli-
hood that the insured will surrender his or her rights or accept an unsatisfactory 
settlement.35 This arrangement is an undeniably promising solution for access 
to justice problems, but it is not always available and affordable, particularly 
once the event triggering the legal dispute has occurred.36 
One of the primary tools for overcoming the economic obstacle to justice 
is attorneys’ contingency fee arrangements, whereby lawyers’ remuneration is 
contingent on success and calculated as a percentage of plaintiffs’ recovery.37 
Contingency fees mitigate plaintiffs’ litigation costs and increase the likelihood 
of pursuing meritorious claims.38 Nevertheless, this solution is insufficient for 
at least six reasons.  
First, in some jurisdictions, contingency fees are deemed unethical or even 
illegal because the lawyer’s stake in the outcome might blur his or her profes-
sional judgment.39 Other jurisdictions prohibit contingency fees but permit a 
“success fee” supplementing an hourly rate.40 This reduces, but does not elimi-
nate, the access problem. Second, even where contingency fees are permitted, 
the lawyer may charge a flat rate per case or per task performed, an hourly rate, 
or some combination of the two. This may occur in specific cases or in certain 
categories of cases, such as those with high-risk or low-value claims. Refusing 
contingency fee arrangements may constitute reasonable screening of non-
meritorious (high-risk) claims, but also thwart meritorious low-value claims.  
Third, litigation costs have other components, such as court charges, wit-
nesses’ and experts’ expenditures and remuneration, and intangible harm. 
These costs may deter victims from suing even if attorneys’ fees are contingent 
on success.41 Fourth, contingency fee lawyers will charge a premium for the 
financing and “insurance” they provide, so their expected hourly rate will be 
greater than that of hourly fee lawyers.42 In other words, substituting a contin-
gency fee for an hourly rate may enable an impecunious victim to bring a suit, 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Shannon, supra note 6, at 871 (discussing legal expenses insurance). 
 36 After-the-event legal expenses insurance is less common and is usually offered only to claim-
ants with high probability of success in jurisdictions where the loser reimburses the winner for his or 
her litigation costs. 
 37 See Sebok, supra note 6, at 99–100 (explaining the notion of a contingency fee). 
 38 Visscher & Schepens, supra note 22, at 17. 
 39 van Boom, supra note 6, at 7; Visscher & Schepens, supra note 22, at 16–17. 
 40 This is the case in France and in Germany. Michael G. Faure et al., No Cure, No Pay and Con-
tingency Fees, in NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION IN EUROPE, supra note 22, at 33, 43–
45. 
 41 See Visscher & Schepens, supra note 22, at 17 (“In his decision of whether or not to bring suit, 
the plaintiff compares his expected benefits with the other costs involved in litigation.”). 
 42 Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 247, 270 (1996) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council, 483 U.S. 711, 
735–36 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
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but it is more likely that the expected costs of litigation (the lawyer’s fee plus 
other costs) will exceed the expected benefit, discouraging a claim.  
Fifth, under a contingency fee arrangement, the client’s and the lawyer’s 
interests are not aligned. The lawyer may have an incentive to settle at a cer-
tain point and for a certain amount that are not optimal for the client.43 Finally, 
contingency fee arrangements can be offered only to those who stand to gain 
from litigation. Defendants have no prospect of gain and do not have a contin-
gency fee option. They may be unable to obtain reasonable representation and 
feel compelled to accept unfair settlements. These deficiencies have motivated 
the development of private litigation-funding models. 
B. Market Developments 
1. Third-Party Litigation Funding 
The most recent commercial method for overcoming the litigation-costs 
barrier to justice, namely third-party litigation funding (“TPF”), emerged in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s.44 It originally involved corporate lawsuits, but sub-
sequently expanded to individual claims including personal injuries, copyright 
and patent violations, and employment discrimination.45 TPF is an advance 
collateralized by the possibility of recovery later in the lawsuit. The advance 
can be used to cover personal expenses during the process, litigation costs, or 
both.46 The claimant’s obligation to pay the funder is contingent, in the sense 
that repayment is only due if the claim succeeds.47 It is nonrecourse in the 
sense that the funder obtains a security interest only in the proceeds of the 
claim,48 and repayment cannot exceed the proceeds.49 Consequently, this 
method may facilitate access to justice only when the victim does not have 
sufficient resources or when he or she is unwilling to bear litigation costs due 
to risk-aversion and the uncertainties of the process. In contrast, when litiga-
tion costs exceed the claimant’s expected benefit from litigation, commercial 
funders, whose expected return is limited by the claimant’s expected benefit, 
have no reason to provide funding. 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Visscher & Schepens, supra note 22, at 21. 
 44 See Beydler, supra note 6, at 1162–63 (providing historical background of TPF); Dietsch, su-
pra note 6, at 693 (same). 
 45 Dietsch, supra note 6, at 693. 
 46 See Nauful, supra note 6, at 16 (explaining that TPF may be used to underwrite the costs of 
litigation or to offset living expenses during the pendency of the suit); Elliott, supra note 7, at 533 
(same); Lyon, supra note 6, at 577–78 (same). 
 47 Elliott, supra note 7, at 533–34. 
 48 Beydler, supra note 6, at 1165. 
 49 Elliott, supra note 7, at 533. 
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There are two major forms of TPF. The first is a contingency-based non-
recourse loan with a relatively high interest rate, usually between two and five 
percent a month, reflecting the risk of the lawsuit’s failure.50 This method is 
common for small claims, where the amount of diligence required to assess the 
specific risk exceeds the benefit of using a more complex structure.51 A 2010 
RAND study indicated that the majority of claims funded this way in the Unit-
ed States arose from automobile accidents, and that the average loan made by 
litigation financing companies ranged between $1,750 and $4,500.52 A compa-
ny may consider several factors when deciding whether to make a loan. These 
factors include the amount of damages claimed, the claim’s strength (probabil-
ity of success), the defendant’s ability to pay, the attorney’s fee arrangement 
(contingency fee preferred), other expenses payable from the proceeds (liens 
and bills), existing legal proceedings that might affect liability, and state of 
residence (apparently due to the laws governing TPF).53 
The second form of TPF is investment in civil actions, whereby the financ-
ing company covers the plaintiff’s costs in whole or in part, on the condition that 
the investor would receive a share of the proceeds if the claim succeeds. The 
success fee usually ranges between twenty percent and forty percent of the dam-
ages, depending on various factors, although it can be even higher.54 In Germa-
ny, this model, known as Prozessfinanzierungsvertrag (process funding con-
tract), is a very common investment among underwriters and capital investors.55 
The second model usually entails a thorough investigation of the claim’s validity 
and the defendant’s solvency.56 It is primarily available for commercial claim-
ants with high-value claims and a high probability of success.57 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 6, at 237–38 (discussing this form of TPF); Beydler, 
supra note 6, at 1159–60, 1163 (same); Lyon, supra note 6, at 574 (same); Binyamin Appelbaum, 
Lawsuit Loans Add New Risk for the Injured, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/01/17/business/17lawsuit.html?pagewanted=all. 
 51 See Molot, supra note 6, at 95. 
 52 STEVEN GARBER, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, 
KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 10–12 (2010). 
 53 See Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 6, at 239–40 (discussing the relevant factors); Shan-
non, supra note 6, at 872, 890 (same); Veljanovski, supra note 6, at 420 (same). 
 54 See, e.g., Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 6, at 239; Veljanovski, supra note 6, at 424 (ex-
plaining that in European countries the fee usually ranges between 20% and 40% of the award or 
settlement, but can get as high as 50%, and that in Australia the range is 30–60%). 
 55 van Boom, supra note 6, at 15–16. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 6, at 239 (“Commercial claims are funded in this riski-
er way because commercial claims are often larger than personal injury claims and therefore are worth 
the diligence required to reduce the funder’s risk.”). In Germany, this form of TPF is also available for 
smaller claims. Michael Coester & Dagobert Nitzsche, Alternative Ways to Finance a Lawsuit in 
Germany, 24 CIV. JUST. Q. 83, 88, 101 (2005). 
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2. Crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding is a rapidly growing method for raising capital to fund var-
ious ventures by aggregating small contributions from many individuals 
through specialized online platforms.58 Though fundraising is a time-honored 
practice,59 technology has simplified it, and dramatically increased its frequen-
cy and reach, with respect to both potential contributors and funded ventures. 
Web-based fundraisers for specific projects date back to the late 1990s,60 but 
the earliest designated crowdfunding platform, ArtistShare, was launched in 
2003 to help musicians raise funds for producing and marketing music al-
bums.61 The first project funded through ArtistShare was Maria Schneider’s 
album Concert in the Garden, an album that ultimately received a Grammy 
Award.62 Some platforms still fund projects only in a specific industry or 
niche, such as music and arts (ArtistShare, Sellaband) or scientific research 
(Experiment). Nonetheless, the most successful and prominent crowdfunding 
platforms, such as Indiegogo and Kickstarter, have no thematic restrictions. 
Initially, crowdfunding followed either a donation-based or a reward-
based model.63 In the former, contributors do not expect any return. In the lat-
ter, fundraisers offer nominal rewards that roughly correlate with the pledged 
amounts, such as formal recognition or gratitude, free access to the funded pro-
ject, or an opportunity to take part in special events with the fundraiser. More 
recently, two additional models have developed. In debt-crowdfunding, fund-
raisers obtain loans from the public, and contributors expect repayment with 
interest.64 In equity-crowdfunding, business ventures obtain equity capital 
from the public, and contributors expect a share of the profits.65  
The Federal Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act of 2012 facil-
itated equity-crowdfunding by exempting small companies, offering up to fif-
ty-million dollars of securities, from the general obligation of securities issuers 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 59 See, e.g., W.R. Vance, The Early History of Insurance Law, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1908) 
(discussing ancient forms of fundraising for the benefit of colleagues in need). 
 60 In 1997, the rock band Marillion raised over £35,000 from fans through the internet to finance 
its first American tour. See Weinstein, supra note 11, at 437. 
 61 Gómez, supra note 7, at 309–10. 
 62 Id. at 310. 
 63 See Gómez, supra note 7, at 309–10, 322 (discussing donation-based and reward-based plat-
forms); Nauful, supra note 6, at 17 (same); Weinstein, supra note 11, passim (same); Elliott, supra 
note 7, at 529, 531–32 (same). 
 64 See Gómez, supra note 7, at 313–14 (discussing debt crowdfunding); Elliott, supra note 7, at 
529, 532–33 (same). 
 65 See Gómez, supra note 7, at 313 (discussing equity crowdfunding); Sumners, supra note 12, at 
42–43 (same); Elliott, supra note 7, at 529, 532 (same). 
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to register with the SEC.66 Similar exemptions were endorsed in several 
states.67 Some websites, such as CircleUp, Crowdfunder, and SeedInvest, are 
dedicated exclusively to equity-crowdfunding, whereas others, such as Indie-
gogo, allow equity-crowdfunding among other forms of crowdsourcing.68 Alt-
hough crowdfunding may appear to have a global audience, ninety-four per-
cent of the industry is concentrated in North America (fifty-nine percent) and 
Europe (thirty-five percent), which is also where most crowdfunding platforms 
are headquartered.69 
 Usually, the fundraiser receives the pledged funds only if a preset capital 
goal is reached, thus reducing the contributors’ risk that undercapitalized pro-
jects will be undertaken.70 Some platforms enable fundraisers to obtain 
pledged funds even without meeting fundraising goals.71 Realizing the risks 
associated with online transactions and the need to build a trustworthy envi-
ronment for their users, crowdfunding platforms started to develop selection 
processes for the projects that they agreed to sponsor and made efforts to en-
sure transparency throughout the funding campaigns.72 To cover their operat-
ing costs and make a profit, these platforms take a certain percentage of the 
funds raised.73 
3. Litigation Crowdfunding 
Litigation crowdfunding is a combination of TPF and crowdfunding: the 
parties in civil disputes seek to finance some of their costs by aggregating 
many small contributions through online platforms. Because the two bases are 
relatively new phenomena, their progeny is nascent. Litigation crowdfunding 
can be carried out through three types of platforms: general crowdfunding plat-
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Elliott, supra note 7, at 532 (discussing the JOBS Act). 
 67 See Gómez, supra note 7, at 314–15 (discussing state legislation of equity crowdfunding); Alan 
McGlade, Michigan Governor Signs Intrastate Crowdfunding Exemption, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2013), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alanmcglade/2013/12/31/michigan-governor-signs-intrastate-crowd
funding-exemption/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20171006114300/https://www.forbes.com/sites/
alanmcglade/2013/12/31/michigan-governor-signs-intrastate-crowdfunding-exemption/] (same). 
 68 This model is still relatively rare. Elliott, supra note 7, at 533. 
 69 Gómez, supra note 7, at 314. 
 70 Id. at 312. For example, Kickstarter contributors are “only charged if the project reaches its 
fundraising goal.” Terms of Use, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/terms-of-use [https://
perma.cc/5VKV-7ZMB]. 
 71 Gómez, supra note 7, at 312. For example, if a campaign does not meet its fundraising goal, 
Indiegogo enables contributors to make the contribution anyway. Evaluating Indiegogo vs. Kickstart-
er?, INDIEGOGO FOR ENTREPRENEURS, https://entrepreneur.indiegogo.com/how-it-works/indiegogo-
vs-kickstarter/ [https://perma.cc/7H7B-DSUK]. 
 72 Gómez, supra note 7, at 311–12. 
 73 Id. 
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forms, specialized litigation crowdfunding platforms, and traditional business 
or personal websites. The first litigation crowdfunding campaigns were 
launched through general crowdfunding platforms, such as Indiegogo.74 Two 
of the three cases outlined in the Introduction provide examples for such use of 
general platforms: the Scottish politician Andy Wightman raised money to fi-
nance his defense against a defamation action through the British website 
Crowdfunder;75 and the Israeli journalist Igal Sarna raised funds to cover his 
liability in defamation through the donation-based spin-off of the Israeli 
crowdfunding website Headstart.76 
In 2014, building on the growing popularity of crowdfunding platforms 
and TPF, the first specialized litigation crowdfunding platform, LexShares, was 
established in the United States.77 LexShares enables crowdfunding of com-
mercial lawsuits, including business torts, professional negligence, and intel-
lectual property violations, but it does not currently allow crowdfunding of 
personal injury claims.78 Contributors expect a substantive return in the case of 
success—a share of the proceeds, as in commercial TPF.79 As an investment-
based mechanism, it is subject to SEC regulation.80 LexShares keeps a certain 
percentage of the funds raised and takes part of the investors’ profit if the claim 
succeeds. Funded Justice, established a few weeks following LexShares, is 
different in three interrelated respects:81 (1) it is a non-investment-based plat-
form,82 (2) it aims at helping those who cannot afford legal services,83 and (3) 
contributors do not need to be SEC accredited investors.84 Another non-
                                                                                                                           
 74 See id. at 324 (listing litigation crowdfunding campaigns). 
 75 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 76 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 77 Daniel Fisher, Feeling Lucky? Maybe It’s Time to Invest in Somebody Else’s Lawsuit, FORBES 
(Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/11/19/ lexshares-invests-in-litigation/ 
[https://perma.cc/S8QL-RTFY]; Debra Cassens Weiss, New Website Uses Crowdfunding to Finance 
Lawsuits, ABA J. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new_website_uses_
crowdfunding_to_finance_lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/A388-Z8TT]. 
 78 Frequently Asked Questions, LEXSHARES, https://www.lexshares.com/pages/faqs [https://
perma.cc/2TMY-AG4D]. 
 79 Gómez, supra note 7, at 328–29. 
 80 Elliott, supra note 7, at 535. For a person to be an accredited investor, he or she must have an 
income exceeding $200,000, or $300,000 for a married couple, in the prior two years or have a net 
worth of more than $1 million, excluding the value of their primary residence. Id. 
 81 Meg Graham, Funded Justice Aims to Help People Raise Funds for Legal Fees, CHI. TRIB. 
(Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/chi-funded-justice-michael-helfand-
bsi-20150105-story.html [https://perma.cc/B46X-4ABX].  
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.; see also Elliott, supra note 7, at 530, 536. 
 84 Elliott, supra note 7, at 536. 
1370 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1357 
investment-based platform is the British website Crowd Justice.85 Both Funded 
Justice and Crowd Justice keep a certain percentage of the funds raised (seven 
percent and five percent, respectively).86 Neither has funded tort litigants yet. 
One of the first litigation crowdfunding websites, Invest4Justice, which ena-
bled investment-based and donation-based crowdfunding,87 is no longer active 
for unknown reasons. 
In addition to general and specialized crowdfunding platforms, crowd-
funding campaigns can be launched on more traditional websites—such as 
business or personal web pages. For example, Maajid Nawaz, the founder and 
chairman of the London-based think tank Quilliam, who was accused by the 
Southern Poverty Law Center of being an anti-Muslim extremist, sought 
crowdfunding for a defamation action through Quilliam’s website.88 
Given the various models of crowdfunding, its potential impact on litiga-
tion funding is much broader than the more developed commercial TPF. To 
begin with, crowdfunding may be available to claimants who seek non-monetary 
remedies, such as an injunction or a declaratory judgment, or whose expected 
damages do not appeal to profit-based funders. Second, TPF is generally of-
fered to claimants, who can pledge a share in the expected recovery as collat-
eral. It is not normally available for defendants who cannot similarly collateral-
ize a loan.89 Potential defendants can obtain legal expenses insurance ex ante, 
but normally cannot obtain special funding ex post, after the occurrence of harm 
for which they are sued.90 In contrast, crowdfunding—particularly donation-
based and reward-based—can also be utilized by defendants, as the Wightman 
and Sarna cases clearly demonstrate. Third, although traditional TPF typically 
covers process costs, crowdfunding can extend to outcome costs, most notably 
civil liability, as in the Sarna case. 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Joshua Rozenberg, Is Crowdfunded Litigation the Future of Justice?, THE GUARDIAN (May 25, 
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/25/crowdfunded-litigation-future-
justice-crowdjustice [https://perma.cc/6H5A-2BD6]. 
 86 Frequently Asked Questions, FUNDED JUSTICE, https://fundedjustice.com/help [https://perma.
cc/7PDK-JU6A]; How It Works, CROWDJUSTICE, https://www.crowdjustice.com/how-it-works/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z7D8-CUEF]. 
 87 See Gómez, supra note 7, at 328–29 (discussing Invest4Justice). 
 88 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 89 E.g., Litigation Finance 101, LEXSHARES, https://www.lexshares.com/litigation_ finance_101 
[https://perma.cc/8TTK-R23C] (explaining that the three principal participants in litigation funding 
are plaintiffs, investors, and attorneys). 
 90 Ordinary loans with fixed interest rates and an unconditional obligation to repay may be avail-
able in the financial markets. 
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C. Legal Obstacles 
The main legal obstacles to litigation funding in common law jurisdic-
tions seem to be the doctrines of champerty, maintenance, and usury. Champer-
ty is an agreement whereby a person with no previous interest in a lawsuit 
supports or maintains it in exchange for a share of the proceeds if the suit suc-
ceeds.91 Although recent discussion of champerty in case law and legal litera-
ture has focused on TPF, the doctrine may also be relevant to investment-based 
crowdfunding of claims. In 2003 the Supreme Court of Ohio famously held in 
Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp.92 that: “a contract making the 
repayment of funds advanced to a party to a pending case contingent upon the 
outcome of that case is void as champerty and maintenance,”93 because it 
“gives a nonparty an impermissible interest in a suit, impedes the settlement of 
the underlying case, and promotes speculation in lawsuits.”94 Rancman was 
overturned by the Ohio legislature,95 but considerable variance remains among 
the states. Some have abolished the prohibition on champerty altogether,96 a 
trend applauded by many scholars.97 Among those that have retained the doc-
trine,98 a few have explicitly applied it to TPF,99 some have specifically re-
fused or excluded such application, and many have not yet addressed the ques-
tion.100 Arguably, if the contributors’ return upon the claim’s success is kept 
separate from the amount of the victim’s recovery, champerty restrictions may 
be avoided.101 So in some jurisdictions, debt-based crowdfunding may be more 
feasible than “equity-based” crowdfunding. 
Maintenance is the “assistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit giv-
en to a litigant by someone who has no bona fide interest in the case [or] med-
dling in someone else’s litigation.”102 The chief differences between mainte-
                                                                                                                           
 91 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424–25 n.15 (1978) (defining champerty); Schnabel v. Taft Broad. 
Co., 525 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (same); Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 6, at 242 
(same); Sebok, supra note 6, at 73 (same); Shannon, supra note 6, at 874 (same); Lyon, supra note 6, 
at 579 (same). 
 92 789 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ohio 2003). 
 93 Id. at 221. 
 94 Id. 
 95 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2017). 
 96 See, e.g., Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226–27 (Mass. 1997) (abolishing champer-
ty); Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 278 (S.C. 2000) (same). 
 97 E.g., Lyon, supra note 6, at 576, 579–80, 589–90. 
 98 See id. at 583–84 (showing that “thirty-two states and the District of Columbia still retain either 
statutes or intact precedents prohibiting champerty”). 
 99 E.g., Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (“[B]ecause recovery is 
tied to the outcome of the litigation, the . . . agreement is champertous.”). 
 100 Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 6, at 243–44; Beydler, supra note 6, at 1177. 
 101 Beydler, supra note 6, at 1159, 1164. 
 102 Sebok, supra note 6, at 72 (alteration in original) (quoting Maintenance, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1039 (9th ed. 2009)); see also Shannon, supra note 6, at 874; Elliott, supra note 7, at 540. 
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nance and champerty are that “the maintainer is not rewarded for his support of 
the litigant”103 and that maintenance applies to the assistance of either party, 
not only the plaintiff. Although champerty is a special case of maintenance,104 
judicial and scholarly analyses of TPF have generally focused only on the for-
mer because TPF is a profit-motivated funding of claimants.105 Yet the general 
prohibition on maintenance may be highly pertinent to civil litigation crowd-
funding, particularly reward-based and donation-based, where contributors 
expect only nominal benefits or none at all. Furthermore, the doctrine of 
maintenance may apply to crowdfunding of defendants’ costs. 
In the well-known 1963 case of NAACP v. Button, the Supreme Court 
held that Virginia could not restrict a third party from providing legal or non-
legal support and encouragement to a litigant by invoking the traditional pro-
hibitions on barratry, maintenance, and champerty.106 This ruling, however, 
was limited to a very special context: a legislative attempt to curb the activities 
of the NAACP, which employed “constitutionally privileged means of expres-
sion to secure constitutionally guaranteed civil rights.”107 The doctrine of 
maintenance is still in force in many states. For example, according to Illinois 
law, a person who “officiously intermeddles in an action that in no way be-
longs to or concerns that person, by maintaining or assisting either party, with 
money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend the action” commits an offense.108 
Similarly, it is unlawful in Mississippi to promise, give, offer, receive, accept, 
solicit, request, or donate any money, services, or property in order to induce 
or assist another “to commence or to prosecute further . . . any proceeding in 
any court.”109 Such state-specific restrictions ought to be considered in as-
sessing the legal feasibility of litigation crowdfunding. 
Usury is lending money at an unreasonably high interest rate.110 Nowa-
days, a maximum rate is usually set through legislation.111 The traditional pro-
hibition on usury cannot normally hinder litigation crowdfunding. Firstly, the 
doctrine does not apply to donation-based and reward-based models, where 
contributors do not expect a profit at all. Moreover, even in the case of invest-
                                                                                                                           
 103 Sebok, supra note 6, at 73. 
 104 Shannon, supra note 6, at 874; Elliott, supra note 7, at 540–41. 
 105 See supra notes 44–57 and accompanying text.  
 106 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963). 
 107 Id. at 442. 
 108 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-12 (2017). 
 109 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-11 (2017). 
 110 See Shannon, supra note 6, at 895 (defining usury); Sheri P. Adler, Note, Alternative Litiga-
tion Finance and the Usury Challenge: A Multi-Factor Approach, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 329, 331, 
333 (2012) (same); Beydler, supra note 6, at 1172 (same); Elliott, supra note 7, at 537 (same). 
 111 For example, the maximum interest rate in New York is sixteen percent per annum. N.Y. 
BANKING LAW § 14-a (McKinney 2018); Adler, supra note 110, at 333–34. 
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ment-based crowdfunding, which generates a financial return, the doctrine of 
usury might be formally inapplicable. Usury laws generally apply only in the 
case of an absolute obligation to repay, not if repayment is subject to a contin-
gency.112 Because investment-based litigation crowdfunding, much like TPF 
arrangements, does not require repayment if the claim fails, usury laws might 
be irrelevant.113 In some jurisdictions, when recovery is almost certain, the 
funding may be deemed a loan, subject to usury restrictions.114 But, even there, 
a usurious return would not necessarily lead to invalidation of the funding ar-
rangement. The court may simply opt for an adjusted interest rate.115 From a 
substantive perspective, high returns in litigation funding arrangements may be 
justified in terms of the greater risks involved, so courts and legislatures will 
be less likely to intervene.116 
II. INVESTMENT-BASED MODELS 
A. The Plaintiff 
1. Potential Benefits 
The first fundamental distinction in assessing litigation crowdfunding ar-
rangements is between investment-based and non-investment-based funding. 
Investment-based crowdfunding is akin to commercial TPF,117 so the scholarly 
debate on the latter may be pertinent to the former. The analysis will, therefore, 
build on existing literature on TPF, and adjust for the differences between the 
two paradigms. 
The benefits of crowdfunding seem evident. First and foremost, as ex-
plained above, litigation costs may impede access to justice.118 The need to 
bear significant costs during a process with an uncertain outcome might dis-
courage meritorious claims—either because the victim cannot afford to pursue 
a claim or because, being risk-averse, the uncertain benefit is not worth the 
                                                                                                                           
 112 44B AM. JUR. 2D Interest and Usury § 2, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2017); Elliott, 
supra note 7, at 537. 
 113 Dopp v. Yari, 927 F. Supp. 814, 823 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding that if the obligation to repay is 
conditional, usury laws do not apply); Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) 
(same); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 101 (Tex. App. 2006) (same); 
Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 6, at 244 (explaining that if the obligation to repay is conditional, 
usury laws do not apply); Shannon, supra note 6, at 892, 895, 896 (same); Beydler, supra note 6, at 
1159, 1163 (same); Elliott, supra note 7, at 537–40 (same). 
 114 See, e.g., Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Mar. 2, 2005) (discussing a workers’ compensation claim that is almost a certain win); Elliott, supra 
note 7, at 540 (discussing the possibility of almost certain recovery). 
 115 Echeverria, 2005 WL 1083704, at *12 (awarding an annual interest of sixteen percent). 
 116 See Shannon, supra note 6, at 893. 
 117 The two forms of TPF are comparable to the two forms of investment-based crowdfunding. 
 118 See supra notes 16–43 and accompanying text. 
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certain costs. “Only those who feel particularly aggrieved or determined, or 
have deep pockets and a sufficient stake,” will tend to embark on a costly and 
uncertain process.119 Investment-based crowdfunding, like TPF, can help over-
come these obstacles and facilitate access to justice.120 Neither TPF nor in-
vestment-based crowdfunding will be available when litigation costs exceed 
the claimant’s expected benefit from litigation, because the claimant’s benefit 
is typically the upper limit of the funders’ return. 
Although increased access to justice is an undeniable consequence of 
crowdfunding, one needs to determine why, and to what extent, it is required. 
The assumptions that substantive law is justifiable, and that it is under-
enforced, underlie this line of argument. Put differently, litigation costs hinder 
litigation, and the volume of litigation is too low to achieve the defensible 
goals of substantive law—efficient deterrence of potential wrongdoers, victim 
compensation, corrective justice, etc.121 All other things being equal, reducing 
or removing litigation costs increases the likelihood of litigation and the level 
of enforcement.122 Crowdfunding may thus be warranted if it facilitates merito-
rious claims that would not otherwise be pursued, thereby helping achieve the 
law’s underlying goals. 
Second, profit-motivated funding may accelerate settlement, saving valu-
able dispute resolution resources. To begin with, it increases defendants’ ten-
dency to settle meritorious claims. To the extent that the screening of claims is 
related to merit, funding signals the claim’s quality. Such a signal induces de-
fendants to settle to avoid a costly process with a relatively certain outcome. 
This decreases the litigation rate and conserves both legal and other related 
costs.123 Seemingly, the funded plaintiff does not have an incentive to settle 
quickly. But, in many funding arrangements, the funder’s return hinges on the 
duration of the process, and in others the funder has some control over the pro-
cess and its conclusion.124 In both cases, the plaintiff will also be under some 
pressure to settle. At any rate, the defendant, who has a sufficiently strong in-
centive to settle, can induce the plaintiff to settle by making a satisfactory offer 
as soon as possible. 
                                                                                                                           
 119 Veljanovski, supra note 6, at 407. 
 120 See Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 6, at 234 (2014) (discussing the increased access to 
justice); Gómez, supra note 7, at 319 (same); Nauful, supra note 6, at 64 (same); Shannon, supra note 
6, at 869 (same); Veljanovski, supra note 6, at 407 (same); Beydler, supra note 6, at 1160, 1168 
(same); Elliott, supra note 7, at 534 (same); Lyon, supra note 6, at 576 (same). 
 121 See Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1799 (2015); Vel-
janovski, supra note 6, at 437–38 (focusing on deterrence). 
 122 Veljanovski, supra note 6, at 438. 
 123 Id. at 439. 
 124 Id. at 440. 
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Third, external litigation funding may generate more accurate settlements, 
thereby furthering the underlying goals of civil law. For example, if the law’s 
primary goal is efficient deterrence, and the extent of damages necessary to 
achieve this goal is X, actual damages should be as close as possible to X. 
Funding may diminish the power imbalance between the parties.125 Plaintiffs 
who can obtain external coverage of litigation costs will not settle for an unsat-
isfactory amount,126 and defendants cannot rely on plaintiffs’ inability to with-
stand a costly and wearisome process to extract an unfair settlement. Continu-
ing the example, a more accurate settlement will result in better internalization 
of the costs of misconduct by potential injurers.127 
Fourth, profit-motivated funding enables a transfer of litigation costs and 
risks to better cost and risk bearers.128 Commercial litigation funders typically 
have more access to financial resources than the average plaintiff, superior 
cost-spreading capacity, and better hedging tools. They are less risk-averse 
than individual plaintiffs, and better risk bearers than corporate plaintiffs. 
Thus, a transfer of litigation costs and risks to commercial funders generates 
economic value.129 A transfer may generate an even clearer benefit in the case 
of crowdfunding: given the diminishing marginal value of individual wealth,130 
spreading litigation costs among numerous investors is better, in terms of over-
all welfare, than placing the financial burden on a single litigant’s shoulders.131 
Fifth, some authors have argued that disclosing information about TPF to 
the court can improve the court’s ability to evaluate the case and reach the cor-
rect decisions on liability and damages.132 The funder’s independent evaluation 
of the claim, the decision to fund it, and the expected return, provide relevant 
evidence about the claim’s relative strength.133 Taking these factors into ac-
                                                                                                                           
 125 See Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 6, at 234 (explaining that TPF equalizes the bargain-
ing power between the parties); Gómez, supra note 7, at 319 (same); Lyon, supra note 6, at 599 
(same). 
 126 See Swan, supra note 6, at 758 (“Most plaintiffs settle because they are unable to wait the 
nearly two years elapsing before the average case comes to trial.”); Beydler, supra note 6, at 1160, 
1161, 1168 ( “[Third party] funding . . . improves plaintiffs’ bargaining position vis-a-vis defendants 
with greater resources, allowing plaintiffs to resist lowball settlement offers or go to trial to vindicate 
their rights . . . [prohibition on third party funding] would likely result in earlier, less accurate settle-
ments.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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count may help courts fine-tune their decisions. More accurate determinations 
of fact serve the underlying goals of substantive law. A by-product of such dis-
closure may be lower interest rates because the funder knows a lower rate 
sends a stronger signal to the court and increases the likelihood of recovery.134 
2. Possible Drawbacks 
An outmoded criticism of any form of external funding of litigation is that 
it enables victims to pursue claims that would not otherwise be pursued and is, 
therefore, expected to result in more litigation.135 Empirical data seem to sup-
port this prediction: a study in Australia showed that there was an increase in 
filings in jurisdictions that allowed TPF, and a decrease in jurisdictions that 
prohibited it.136 This criticism of funding derives from the historical perception 
that litigation was an evil to be avoided.137 The common law adopted various 
mechanisms to show its disapproval of those who motivated litigation, includ-
ing strict bans on barratry, maintenance, and champerty.138 The perception that 
litigation is an evil has gradually waned. Litigation and the threat thereof are 
considered important tools in righting wrongs and regulating human behavior.139 
The fear of additional litigation has transformed into the institutional con-
cern that external funding would overburden the legal system.140 Still, there is 
reason to believe that any increase in litigation rate will be limited. Claimants 
often seek funding for lawsuits they would bring anyway; funders’ due dili-
gence filters out many of the claims that would not be brought without external 
funding, and defendants have an incentive to settle quickly and avoid litiga-
tion.141 Consequently, although a certain upsurge in litigation is foreseeable, it 
should not and, in fact, does not clog the system.142 
This leads us to the first real concern: external funding might encourage 
frivolous or non-meritorious claims.143 Such claims are undesirable because 
they waste scarce administrative resources without furthering the underlying 
goals of substantive law.144 For example, if liability aims to deter wrongful 
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conduct, an unfounded claim will consume administrative resources without 
any expected benefit and, if successful, lead to over-deterrence. The general 
response to this concern is that substantive and procedural rules, as well as 
lawyers’ ethical commitments, are designed to prevent frivolous claims.145 
More specific retorts focus on two features of the funding model: the funder’s 
stakes in the particular case and its credibility as a repeat player. 
Regarding the funder’s stakes, profit-motivated funders will only fund 
cases likely to yield a return on their investment. It is unlikely that meritless 
claims, with low probability of success and therefore low expected damages,146 
will be funded on a nonrecourse contingency basis.147 Funders may agree to 
fund riskier claims for a higher return, but funding frivolous suits is implausi-
ble if the funders’ profit derives solely from the claimant’s proceeds.148 Indeed, 
interviews with European third-party litigation funders have revealed that they 
devote considerable time to screening cases considered for funding, reject 
most, and fund only those with high odds of success and monetary value.149 
Non-meritorious cases have low probability of success and negative expected 
returns if they go to court. Given the profit-maximizing screening process, the 
probability of funding unworthy claims is low.150 
In addition, commercial third-party funders are often repeat players. Thus, 
the signal sent to the other party and to the court by their involvement in a par-
ticular case is correlated with their overall credibility as funders.151 If the fun-
der’s screening is credible, its selection of the specific case will provide a 
stronger incentive for the defendant to settle, and settle at a more accurate 
amount. This will increase the funder’s expected profit and reduce its costs. 
Similarly, if the funder is credible and the court is aware of the external fund-
ing, expected liability—and the funder’s share thereof—will rise. To establish 
credibility, the funder will conduct a thorough due diligence, and this too will 
reduce the likelihood of meritless claims. 
Litigation crowdfunding is different from traditional litigation funding: it 
usually involves multiple investors with minor stakes. Because the stakes are 
small, individual investors are less concerned about the possibility of the 
claim’s failure and are therefore less selective.152 Put differently, whereas tradi-
                                                                                                                           
 145 Lyon, supra note 6, at 595; see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-68(e) (2017) (enabling courts to 
award damages against parties presenting frivolous claims or defenses). 
 146 Expected damages are the product of the probability of success and the extent of provable 
harm. 
 147 Lyon, supra note 6, at 591. 
 148 Shannon, supra note 6, at 875; Lyon, supra note 6, at 593–94. 
 149 Veljanovski, supra note 6, at 445. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Lyon, supra note 6, at 595. 
 152 Elliott, supra note 7, at 547. 
1378 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1357 
tional litigation-funding firms with high stakes conduct due diligence and se-
lect cases with the highest expected return, litigation crowdfunding contribu-
tors “may invest in a larger volume of cases that have a smaller likelihood of 
success.”153 Moreover, as the stakes are small, uninformed individuals may be 
encouraged to make hasty and risky investments. Because the cohort of partic-
ipants is large, diverse, and case-specific, severe collective action problems 
prevent the development and application of selection criteria by funders. Final-
ly, many contributors are not repeat players in the particular segment of the 
crowdfunding industry or in crowdfunding generally. They have neither the 
interest nor the ability to establish credibility that will strengthen the signal 
that their involvement sends to the other party and to the court. 
These properties may lower the bar for those who seek funding but will 
not eliminate the rational profit-driven screening of claims. Although the par-
ticipants in litigation crowdfunding bear much smaller risks than commercial 
funding firms, they are still profit-seeking players who prefer investment op-
portunities with the highest possible expected value. The legal system can and 
should facilitate rational and informed investment by requiring claimants to 
disclose relevant information, as in other cases of “public offering.”154 This 
will prevent uninformed or underinformed investments, upgrade the selection 
process, and maintain correlation between the willingness to invest and the 
claim’s merit. In addition, although the crowdfunding participants’ motivation 
and ability to vet claims are inferior to those of commercial litigation funding 
firms, the crowdfunding platform may assume the screening functions that are 
carried out by the funder in ordinary TPF. The platforms may have an incen-
tive to list only sufficiently strong claims, because failing to do so will result in 
unsuccessful investments, deter investors, and reduce revenue. They may also 
have the capacity, as aggregators of considerable capital, to conduct due dili-
gence. Indeed, realizing the risks associated with electronic commerce and the 
need to offer users a reliable venue, crowdfunding platforms have started to 
develop and employ project-selection processes and endeavor to ensure trans-
parency throughout the funding campaigns.155 Presumably, these developments 
will also be reflected in the context of litigation funding. 
Critics may argue that willingness to invest does not always indicate the 
claim’s strength, because investors make mistakes, and their investment in a 
specific project may be so small (and their portfolio so diverse) that the partic-
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ular investment does not generate any reliable signal. Although specific inves-
tors may make mistakes in specific cases, there is sufficiently strong correla-
tion between the willingness to invest in a specific claim and its relative merit, 
assuming relevant information is available.156 The fact that a successful crowd-
funding campaign requires numerous individual decisions to invest reduces the 
likelihood of systematic mistakes (again, assuming relevant information is 
available). Admittedly, the average size of the investment impairs the signal’s 
quality, but the large number of investors reinforces it, and investors’ expecta-
tion for profit may also be translated into additional platform-based screening. 
If these predictions are nonetheless proven wrong, and empirical studies reveal 
market failures, investment-based crowdfunding can be subject to the same 
vetting process proposed below for non-investment-based crowdfunding. 
The second concern with external funding is that it might unnecessarily 
prolong litigation by disincentivizing the plaintiff to settle.157 The plaintiff 
might reject what would otherwise be a fair settlement offer and hold out for a 
larger sum of money, increasing administrative costs. This argument is uncon-
vincing. It is not at all clear that the victim’s position regarding settlement is 
skewed by funding. The victim might rush into an unsatisfactory settlement 
without external funding. So, funding may ameliorate rather than create an 
incentive problem. In fact, the funder’s or the platform’s risk-analysis can help 
the victim make more informed decisions about settlement.158 Moreover, as 
explained above, external funding might provide proper incentives to settle: 
sometimes the funder’s fee increases gradually over time (so the victim is 
harmed by unnecessary prolongation);159 at times the funder has some control 
over the process, and will exert pressure to accept a cost-effective settlement; 
and funding incentivizes the injurer to make fairer offers that the victim can 
more easily accept. 
A third concern is that profit-seeking funders would require and exercise 
control over the process in order to secure their interests.160 They may wish to 
select the attorney, direct his or her strategy, and decide whether, when, and 
under what conditions to settle.161 This is arguably problematic because attor-
neys should act independently for their clients’ benefit, and the funder’s inter-
ests are not necessarily aligned with the claimant’s. But, it is unclear whether 
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control by a profit-maximizing actor is detrimental,162 and even if it is, fun-
der’s control can be limited or banned without giving up the benefits of exter-
nal funding altogether.163 Thus, in some jurisdictions, the funder’s level of con-
trol over the process is taken into account in assessing whether a TPF agree-
ment violates public policy.164 In others, funders’ control is specifically prohib-
ited.165 Additionally, funders’ practices may be subject to self-imposed con-
straints. The American Legal Finance Association code of conduct stipulates 
that funders shall not take any step to “acquire ownership in the consumer’s 
litigation” or to “interfere or participate in the consumer’s litigation, and/or 
attempt to influence the consumer’s litigation.”166 Still, funder control is al-
lowed and common in some countries, most notably Australia.167 
Furthermore, the risk of funder’s control is much smaller in the case of 
litigation crowdfunding. A commercial third-party funder has a substantial 
stake and, hence, a sufficiently strong incentive to intervene, and because there 
is usually a single funder, it has the power to do so. In the case of crowdfund-
ing, there are many investors with small stakes. Because the stakes are limited, 
the funders are less interested in controlling the process, and because they are 
many, collective action problems will hinder any attempt at devising a control 
strategy.168 Of course, as litigation crowdfunding develops, crowdfunding plat-
forms may wish to attain some control over funded claims to protect investors 
and increase their own competitiveness. In such a case, regulation may be ap-
propriate. 
The fourth concern with profit-motivated funding, which is one of the 
traditional rationales for the champerty doctrine,169 is that claimants’ plight 
might be exploited by funders to capture a significant share of any recovery. To 
the extent that fair compensation to victims is one of the primary goals of civil 
law, profit-seeking funders might generate a problem. American experience 
with TPF demonstrates that the amount payable to the funder following a suc-
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cessful conclusion of the case might leave hardly anything for the claimant.170 
For example, the plaintiff was obliged to repay 280% of the advance in Ranc-
man,171 and 240% in Fausone.172 
There are two possible responses. First, the high return may be justified 
because the funder bears: (1) the risk of no award in the case of failure; (2) the 
risk of insufficient award in the case of success, due to the nonrecourse nature 
of the “loan”; and (3) the cost of collecting data about claims and their poten-
tial value (either directly, in the case of TPF, or indirectly, in the case of in-
vestment-based crowdfunding). Second, if high returns pose a real problem, 
caps can be set. Some state legislatures have indeed proposed such caps,173 but 
these “one size fits all” rates were criticized for being unrelated to the level of 
risk incurred by funders.174 Scholars are divided on this matter. Some argue 
that funders’ yield should be subject to ordinary usury rates, to a maximum 
percentage of the claimant’s recovery, or both.175 Others contend that deregula-
tion would attract more players into the market and increase competition.176 
The fifth concern is that external funders will not adequately inform cli-
ents of the true cost of the advance under the agreement, resulting in inefficient 
and unfair arrangements.177 This problem can be ameliorated either voluntarily 
by the industry or through regulation, as the experience with TPF demon-
strates.178 For instance, members of the American Legal Finance Association 
have reached an agreement with the New York Attorney General, guaranteeing 
transparency to consumers.179 At least three states enacted specific legislation 
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requiring systematic disclosure of the costs and fees, with a lawyer’s acknowl-
edgment that the relevant information was properly disclosed,180 and others 
consider following suit.181 
B. The Defendant 
1. Process Costs 
Special profit-motivated litigation financing is not usually available for 
defendants because they cannot provide comparable litigation-related collat-
erals. Thus, defendants can only obtain ordinary loans, with a fixed interest 
rate and an obligation to repay that is unconditional on case outcome, or can 
use legal expenses insurance where available. One can envisage a special fund-
ing model whereby the funder covers the defendant’s litigation costs, and re-
payment is contingent on the claimant’s failure to obtain a certain outcome, 
such as damages equal to or exceeding the claimed amount. In the case of the 
defendant’s “success,” the funder will be entitled to a share of the difference 
between the amount claimed (or another prearranged amount) and the amount 
payable to the claimant. For example, assume that P sues D for $100,000. F 
agrees to cover the costs of D’s legal defense in the amount of $3,000 under 
the condition that D will pay ten percent of any “saving” relative to the amount 
claimed. If the claim is denied, F is entitled to $10,000, and if P is awarded 
$60,000, F is entitled to $4,000. 
To my knowledge, such a model has not been used in practice, either by 
traditional third-party funders or through crowdfunding platforms. A possible 
explanation is that if the expected saving is significant (because the claim is 
weak), the defendant will not wish to share it with a third-party, and, if the ex-
pected saving is small, a third-party will be less likely to invest in a share 
thereof. Moreover, because the defendant cannot derive financial gain from the 
process, he or she might be unable to repay the funder in cases defined as 
“success,” discouraging potential investors and lenders. But, given the theoret-
ical possibility of profit-driven funding of the defendant’s litigation costs, a 
critical evaluation is required. 
The benefits reflect those of crowdfunding claims. First, external funding 
may enable impecunious defendants to fight frivolous or meritless claims. In 
light of the risks involved, profit-seeking funders will probably select the very 
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worthy and filter out undeserving defendants. Because the crowdfunding mod-
el involves many investors with small stakes, platforms will gradually develop 
and implement screening criteria to attract investors. Second, funding a deserv-
ing defendant may signal the claim’s weakness, and induce the claimant to set-
tle or drop the case, saving administrative resources. Third, by diminishing any 
power imbalance between the parties, external funding may generate more ac-
curate settlements,182 where the claim is not absolutely meritless, preventing an 
undesirable outcome. Fourth, profit-motivated funding constitutes a transfer of 
litigation costs and risks to better cost and risk bearers.183 Fifth, disclosing in-
formation about a funding arrangement to the court can improve its ability to 
evaluate the case and reach the correct decisions on liability and damages. 
The possible criticism that external funding might encourage defendants 
to assert unfounded defenses is unconvincing. Profit-motivated funders will 
only fund cases likely to yield a return on their investment.184 In the case of 
crowdfunding, the large number of investors and their relatively small stakes 
might affect their ability and willingness to conduct due diligence, but crowd-
funding platforms have the incentives to assume these tasks in order to attract 
investors. The related argument that funding might unnecessarily prolong liti-
gation by disincentivizing the defendant to settle is also unpersuasive for rea-
sons similar to those outlined above.185 The potential problems of funder’s 
control over the defense, excessive returns, and nondisclosure of information 
can be similarly resolved through regulation. 
2. Outcome Costs 
Assume now that the defendant wishes to crowdfund the outcome rather 
than the process. If the parties settle or if the court finds the defendant liable, 
he or she must pay damages to the claimant. Before the conclusion of the case, 
when the obligation to pay damages is still an uncertain risk, investment-based 
crowdfunding may be possible. At least one scholar proposed a system that 
would allow defendants to share their risk of liability with an investment com-
pany by paying the investor the expected value of the lawsuit plus a premi-
um.186 This proposal may be even more feasible when the risk is widely spread 
through crowdfunding.187 
                                                                                                                           
 182 See Beydler, supra note 6, at 1160, 1161, 1168. 
 183 See Veljanovski, supra note 6, at 439. 
 184 See supra notes 117–134 and accompanying text. 
 185 See supra notes 135–181 and accompanying text. 
 186 Molot, supra note 6, at 82–84. 
 187 The defendant will pay (or commit to pay) the expected value of the claim plus a premium to 
the crowdfunding platform. Contributors will pledge to cover full liability if imposed, in return for a 
respective share of the defendant’s prepayment if the claim is denied. 
1384 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1357 
Once the case has concluded, by a settlement or a judgment, and the obli-
gation to pay becomes certain, the defendant can invoke liability insurance, but 
investment-based crowdfunding is no longer viable. At this point, the defend-
ant has nothing to offer investors, not even a chance of reduced or no liability. 
Thus, the defendant cannot seek crowdfunding. In this respect, funders’ eco-
nomic motivation is critical. As Part III will shortly demonstrate, in the ab-
sence of economic motivation, individuals may take part in crowdfunding the 
defendant’s outcome costs. 
III. NON-INVESTMENT-BASED MODELS 
A. Overview 
The analysis changes dramatically once we move from investment-based 
to non-investment-based crowdfunding. Some of the general and specialty liti-
gation crowdfunding platforms allow profit-based and donation-based or re-
ward-based projects, whereas some do not allow fundraisers to offer contribu-
tors revenue sharing.188 If funders do not pursue financial gain, their decision 
to fund will be based more on intuitions and emotions, and less on solid data 
and cost-benefit analysis. Consequently, they may be willing to fund ventures 
that profit-seeking funders will avoid, and disinclined to fund ventures that 
profit-seeking funders will embrace. These differences in funding strategies 
have considerable and normatively relevant implications. 
What drives individuals to donate money to a litigant without any pro-
spect of financial gain is a preliminary question. An individual’s motivations 
can be personal, moral, or political, and they can relate to the funded party or 
to his or her opponent.189 Thus, one may financially support a litigant when the 
funder is the litigant’s family member or friend, or the opponent’s foe; the fun-
der wishes to encourage the litigant’s conduct or views or to discourage the 
opponent’s conduct or views; or the funder perceives the litigant as belonging 
to the “right camp” or the opponent as belonging to the “wrong camp” in a 
civil war of ideas. For example, an individual who finds the business practices 
of a company repugnant may contribute funds to a lawsuit against it, even if 
the claim does not arise from these practices.190 Similarly, an individual who 
believes a particular claim is a strategic lawsuit against public participation 
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may help finance the defense. A donor who does not expect direct gain may 
nonetheless derive some indirect economic benefit from the lawsuit. For ex-
ample, it can help finance an action against its competitor.191 
This Part examines how the different motivations affect the normative 
analysis. It begins with non-investment-based crowdfunding of the plaintiff’s 
costs. It then considers the defendant’s costs, distinguishing between process 
and outcome costs. 
B. The Plaintiff 
Non-investment-based crowdfunding, like any other form of external 
funding, may facilitate access to justice. It enables victims to pursue meritori-
ous claims when they cannot fund litigation with their own resources or are 
unwilling to bear definite costs for an uncertain future benefit due to risk-
aversion. Presumably, non-investment-based crowdfunding will facilitate ac-
cess even where investment-based crowdfunding is improbable because the 
claimant’s litigation costs exceed his or her expected benefit or because a non-
monetary remedy is sought. Furthermore, any type of crowdfunding helps 
spread the financial burden. Relatively expensive claims can be completely 
funded by aggregating many small monetary contributions, without any single 
individual risking a substantial sum of money.192 Given the diminishing mar-
ginal value of individual wealth, spreading the cost, in itself, enhances overall 
welfare.193 
Even so, non-investment-based crowdfunding raises or exacerbates fun-
damental problems. Most importantly, although facilitating meritorious claims, 
it also fuels excessive and frivolous litigation. TPF and, to a more limited ex-
tent, investment-based crowdfunding, involve reasonable screening, either by 
the funder (TPF) or by the many funders and the platform (crowdfunding), 
because financing frivolous claims has a negative expected value.194 Not-for-
profit funders do not conduct due diligence. At times, they do not really care 
how strong the claim is: they simply like the litigant or the cause or dislike the 
opponent or the defense strategy. The erratic screening may bring groundless 
claims to court and filter out many meritorious claims. 
The business model used by crowdfunding platforms increases the risk of 
frivolous litigation. Typically, these platforms take a certain percentage of the 
funds raised.195 In the specific context of litigation crowdfunding, this means 
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that the platform will make a profit regardless of whether or not the claimant 
succeeds. Thus, crowdfunding platforms have a patent incentive to allow more 
campaigns. This incentive is somewhat mitigated by the platforms’ need to 
maintain credibility to attract donors and, consequently, fundraisers. But the 
counter-incentive is meager, because people who simply want to help their fa-
vored party do not care much about platforms’ past success rates, and even 
those who do may be satisfied with minimal screening that may be over-
inclusive from a legal and economic merit perspective. 
For the same reasons, non-investment-based crowdfunding does not sig-
nal the quality of the claim. Therefore it does not provide the defendant an ad-
ditional incentive to settle, apart from the knowledge that the claimant can en-
dure a long process. Neither does this model generate any incentives for the 
claimant to settle. In some investment-based funding models, the funder’s re-
turn hinges on the duration of the process, and this incentivizes the claimant 
not to prolong the process unreasonably. But in non-investment-based crowd-
funding, the claimant is not expected to lose anything, so he or she has no in-
centive to settle. Moreover, unless prohibited by law, profit-driven funders or 
funding platforms may exercise some control over the process and its duration. 
In contrast, benevolent contributors would not normally have any control. 
Likewise, external funding generally helps claimants obtain more accu-
rate settlements by eliminating power imbalances between the parties.196 But 
non-investment-based crowdfunding might provide a tailwind for weak claims. 
Claimants might be encouraged to demand more than they deserve and protract 
the process to extort defendants. This can result in unwarranted or excessive 
settlements, undermining the goals of civil law. 
The other issues associated with investment-based litigation crowdfund-
ing do not arise here. An individual who donated a small amount and does not 
expect any benefit has no real interest in controlling the process. Even if he or 
she did, it would be almost impossible to devise a strategy due to collective 
action problems. Crowdfunding platforms usually allow donors to follow the 
progress of their project, and this will probably satisfy benevolent litigation 
funders. Additionally, the problems of usurious arrangements and nondisclo-
sure of information about the litigant’s “debt”197 cannot arise if funders expect 
no return. 
In summary, the problems with non-investment-based crowdfunding are 
all related to the absence of proper screening. To overcome these problems the 
law must require reliable vetting of claims. Imposing a professional selection 
                                                                                                                           
 196 See supra notes 122–124 and accompanying text (explaining the competing incentives to settle 
for a well-funded plaintiff). 
 197 Supra notes 164–176 and accompanying text. 
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mechanism will reduce the risks of frivolous claims, prolonged litigation, and 
inaccurate settlements. For example, the claimant’s attorney may be required 
to acknowledge that he or she has found the claim meritorious. As an assur-
ance of reliability, the lawyer may be required to take the case on a contingen-
cy fee basis198 or pay the defendant’s costs if the claim is found frivolous. This 
vetting method can be easily implemented irrespective of the nature of the 
platform but might be deemed inadequately reliable. 
Alternatively, the crowdfunding platform can be obligated, under specific 
legislation or in accordance with the general principles of tort law, to employ 
reasonable selection criteria, including independent legal and economic eval-
uation of each claim. The platform could face liability for the defendant’s costs 
if a funded claim is found frivolous. This vetting method can be implemented 
easily by specialized litigation crowdfunding platforms that can incorporate the 
necessary legal and economic analysis into their business model. General 
crowdfunding platforms, whose portfolios are very diverse and dynamic, might 
be less inclined to undertake such a task, unless litigation crowdfunding 
through such platforms becomes sufficiently common. Traditional business or 
personal websites are probably the least likely to initiate non-investment-based 
litigation crowdfunding if such vetting is required. 
A less biased, though admittedly costlier approach, is to require prelimi-
nary judicial scrutiny of the claim. The idea that courts should vet a claim be-
fore the power of the masses is harnessed to wage a legal battle against another 
is not radical as might appear. In some jurisdictions, a similar threshold re-
quirement is applied in the context of class actions. For example, under Israeli 
legislation a class action can be certified only if there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the claim will succeed.199 In the United States, the Supreme Court held 
only several years ago that an inquiry into the merits of the case may be neces-
sary for certifying a class action.200 
Critics may argue that there is no reason to subject non-investment-based 
crowdfunding to legal constraints that do not apply to other forms of not-for-
profit litigation funding. For example, in a recent highly publicized case ven-
ture capitalist Peter Thiel funded Hulk Hogan’s lawsuit against the online news 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text. 
 199 Class Actions Law, 5366–2006, SH 264, § 8(a)(1) (Isr.). 
 200 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011). The Court departed from the 
time-honored ruling in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (noting that a federal 
court does not have “authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to 
determine whether it may be maintained as a class action”). The Court ultimately characterized the 
prior ruling as dictum because the judge was examining notice requirements and not performing a true 
inquiry into the case’s merits. Id. at 351 n.6. 
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platform Gawker for invasion of privacy.201 Yet, in most cases, the likelihood 
that an individual will be willing and able to fully finance another person’s 
lawsuit without any expected return seems much lower than the probability of 
a successful crowdfunding campaign. The new platforms enable plaintiffs to 
easily reach numerous potentially-interested individuals who are asked to con-
tribute relatively small amounts. At any rate, the law can restrict or regulate all 
kinds of litigation funding when deemed necessary. This is neither new nor 
peculiar, as the preceding analysis of the doctrine of maintenance202 and public 
policy constraints on TPF203 demonstrates. 
Arguably, a claimant seeking not-for-profit contributions may frame his 
or her appeal as an investment-based crowdfunding campaign merely to cir-
cumvent the proposed screening process. Individual investors, however, will 
not invest in meritless claims,204 and crowdfunding platforms will still have an 
incentive to employ screening processes to maintain credibility of the invest-
ment model and attract investors. A related problem may be the willingness of 
some individuals to contribute to an investment-based crowdfunding campaign 
without expecting financial return for personal, moral or political reasons. Yet, 
it is less likely that such contributions will suffice to reach the campaign’s cap-
ital goal (a typical precondition for the campaign’s “success”), and as long as 
the campaign is presented to the public as investment-based, the platform still 
has an incentive to employ its own screening process.205 
C. The Defendant 
For the most part, the analysis of non-investment-based crowdfunding of 
claims is applicable mutatis mutandis to crowdfunding of defenses. However, 
because defense lawyers do not provide legal services on a contingency fee 
basis and have an economic interest in accepting all cases,206 they cannot serve 
                                                                                                                           
 201 Ryan Mac & Matt Drange, This Silicon Valley Billionaire Has Been Secretly Funding Hulk 
Hogan’s Lawsuits Against Gawker, FORBES (May 24, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/
2016/05/24/this-silicon-valley-billionaire-has-been-secretly-funding-hulk-hogans-lawsuits-against-
gawker/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20180306065555/https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2016/05/
24/this-silicon-valley-billionaire-has-been-secretly-funding-hulk-hogans-lawsuits-against-gawker/]. 
 202 See supra notes 91–116 and accompanying text. 
 203 See Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 6, at 235 (discussing the problem of external control); 
Gómez, supra note 7, at 319–20 (same); Shannon, supra note 6, at 873 (same); Elliott, supra note 7, at 
534–35 (same); Lyon, supra note 6, at 601–02 (same). 
 204 Unless the framing also involves some form of misrepresentation that is addressed by criminal 
law. 
 205 As stated in supra notes 134–180 and accompanying text, if empirical studies reveal market 
failures, investment-based crowdfunding can be subject to the same vetting process as non-
investment-based crowdfunding. 
 206 Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, Why Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attor-
neys Fixed Fee Contracts, 47 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 16, 16–17 (2016). 
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as reliable vetting agents. Imposing liability for the claimant’s costs on a de-
fense lawyer who vetted a frivolous defense may ameliorate, but not solve, the 
problem. A legal defense should, therefore, be vetted by an independent party 
like the crowdfunding platform or the court. If platforms engaged in litigation 
funding are required to evaluate defenses, it is reasonable to require platform-
vetting of claims and defenses alike, instead of implementing a different meth-
od for each category. If judicial scrutiny is used for claims, it can also be used 
for defenses. 
More importantly, non-investment-based crowdfunding models enable 
coverage of a new litigation-related cost that cannot normally be financed by 
commercial third-party funders or investment-based crowdfunding partici-
pants. Once the case has concluded, by a settlement or a judgment, the defend-
ant cannot utilize investment-based funding models because he or she cannot 
offer investors any prospect of financial gain, not even a chance of reduced or 
no liability. But, if individuals empathize with the defendant or disapprove of 
the claimant, the defendant may seek crowdfunding of his financial obligation 
through non-investment-based models. For example, Igal Sarna, the journalist 
who was found liable for libeling Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 
easily raised the full amount from Netanyahu’s detractors through a crowd-
funding website.207 
Liability crowdfunding has two obvious benefits: it guarantees full com-
pensation to successful claimants and spreads the cost, thereby enhancing 
overall welfare.208 Nonetheless, under certain circumstances it might under-
mine at least one of the primary goals of civil liability. According to classical 
economic theory, efficient deterrence entails internalization by the wrongdoer 
of the social harm caused by his or her wrongful conduct.209 Only if the ex-
pected liability is equivalent to (or greater than) the expected externalized cost, 
will the potential injurer internalize that cost and take cost-effective precau-
tions.210 Compensatory damages can secure optimal deterrence only if wrong-
doers are always liable for harms caused by their wrongful conduct, and com-
pensatory damages are set in accordance with the social cost of the wrongful 
conduct. If wrongdoers do not internalize the costs of their wrongful conduct, 
potential wrongdoers are not incentivized to take cost-effective precautions.211 
Liability crowdfunding enables wrongdoers to evade the burden and might 
                                                                                                                           
 207 Supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text (discussing the background and results of Sarna’s 
case). 
 208 See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text (demonstrating one case where the general public 
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 209 Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 335 (2012). 
 210 Id. at 346. 
 211 Id. at 344. 
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undercut potential wrongdoers’ incentives to avoid wrongful conduct in similar 
situations. 
When crowdfunding might have such an adverse effect, and how the law 
should respond, are crucial questions. One may argue that because a potential 
wrongdoer can never be certain (ex ante) that his or her liability will be cov-
ered through crowdfunding (ex post), the theoretical possibility of crowdfund-
ing will not affect the conduct. This argument fails, however, because it as-
sumes uncertain coverage of liability cannot affect deterrence. In fact, a suffi-
ciently high probability of such coverage may induce wrongdoing. For exam-
ple, if the potential victim’s expected harm is $100 and the cost of precautions 
that can eliminate the risk is $50, taking these precautions is desirable and 
should be encouraged. A fifty-one percent chance of liability crowdfunding 
will reduce the expected cost of failing to take the precautions to 
49%×$100=$49, and induce the potential wrongdoer not to take them (because 
$50>$49). 
The real question, therefore, is when the perceived probability of crowd-
funding ex ante is sufficiently high to undermine efficient deterrence. Many 
variables can influence the perceived probability. For example, crowdfunding 
is more likely in salient (“high-profile”) cases with political or public-interest 
overtones. Thus, it will be easier to obtain funding in cases of defamation of 
public figures, than in private tenant-landlord disputes. The fact that all three 
cases mentioned in the introduction were salient (though two involved process 
costs) is not a coincidence.212 This fact illustrates where litigants feel confident 
enough to launch crowdfunding campaigns, and this ex post reality is surely 
correlated with, and reflected in, the ex ante perceptions of the probability of 
crowdfunding. Similarly, the ex ante probability of liability crowdfunding may 
be lower if the potential injurer has already sought crowdfunding in previous 
cases of alleged wrongdoing. It might be more difficult to mobilize the public 
to support a repeat-litigator (who may be suspected of abuse). Likewise, very 
well-connected individuals, such as celebrities, may have a higher ex ante 
probability of successful crowdfunding. 
From an economic perspective, crowdfunding should be prohibited when 
it leads to under-deterrence. The implementation of this imperative, however, 
might not be simple. One possible technique is a case-by-case evaluation of the 
ex ante perception of the probability of crowdfunding. Defendants may need to 
obtain judicial permission for launching a liability crowdfunding campaign, 
and courts will be able to deny permission on public policy grounds if the ex 
ante probability is too high. This option entails relatively high administrative 
costs. Alternatively, the law can prohibit crowdfunding in preset categories of 
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cases where the ex ante probability is sufficiently high. Unless reliance on the-
oretical predictions is deemed appropriate, this option requires some empirical 
work, and relevant data can only accumulate if liability crowdfunding is un-
regulated for a certain period of time. This model can be applied incrementally, 
prohibiting liability crowdfunding in a specific category of cases once it tran-
spires that the probability of crowdfunding in such cases is high.  
The most extreme legal technique for addressing the under-deterrence 
problem is a general prohibition on crowdfunding. A possible rationale may be 
that prohibition is economically justified when the ex ante probability of 
crowdfunding is high, and harmless when the ex ante probability is low. Un-
less potential wrongdoers misperceive high probability as low, and in the ab-
sence of dramatic changes in public preferences after the wrongdoing, low ex 
ante probability usually means that the wrongdoer will not be able to obtain 
crowdfunding anyway. Therefore, a general prohibition will have a very lim-
ited impact in cases of low ex ante probability. Lawmakers should decide 
whether the simplicity of a general prohibition that does not entail case-by-
case adjudication outweighs its cost in terms of preventing non-objectionable 
crowdfunding campaigns (where the perceived ex ante probability was low). 
Theoretically, the prohibition may be relaxed if the defendant is judg-
ment-proof.213 If the potential wrongdoer is unable to fully bear the external-
ized costs of the wrongful conduct ex post, he or she will not internalize them 
ax ante. From the potential wrongdoer’s perspective, the expected expense 
may be lower than the expected social harm, so the incentive for taking cost-
effective precautions is impaired.214 To illustrate, assume there is a two percent 
chance that D’s conduct will cause a $100,000 loss to P. D can reduce the 
probability to one percent by taking certain precautions at a cost of $800. The 
cost of care ($800) is lower than the ensuing reduction in expected harm 
($1000), so failure to take precautions is negligent. Assume further that the 
value of D’s assets is $30,000 and that D is risk-neutral. Even if liability for 
negligent conduct was certain, it would not provide an adequate incentive. D’s 
expected sanction in case of failing to take precautions would be 
2%×$30,000=$600, whereas the cost of care is $800. Liability crowdfunding 
may be allowed for the difference between the defendant’s liability and finan-
cial ability ($70,000 in the above example). This will secure full compensation 
and cost-spreading without impairing the admittedly-insufficient deterrent ef-
                                                                                                                           
 213 See supra notes 127–128 and accompanying text. 
 214 See Kyle D. Logue, Solving the Judgment-Proof Problem, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1375, 1375 (1994) 
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fect of liability. In practice, however, a judgment-proof defendant does not 
have an incentive to seek crowdfunding for the difference between liability and 
ability, because he or she will not pay this amount anyway. 
One possible criticism of the proposed prohibition is that liability crowd-
funding operates much like liability insurance, which is permitted and very 
common.215 But the analogy is flawed. Liability insurance is based on profes-
sional ex ante analysis of and response to risks. Insurers can refuse to under-
write certain people or activities, thereby preserving liability incentives. They 
can also control the insureds’ conduct through deductibles and coverage caps, 
exclude liability for certain types of conduct or for the materialization of cer-
tain risks, adjust premiums based on past experience or current compliance 
with standards of conduct, and so forth.216 Liability crowdfunding is an ex post 
mechanism, that is not based on risk analysis, not responsive to risks, and in-
capable of effecting desirable changes in conduct. 
Another possible criticism is that even where liability crowdfunding leads 
to under-deterrence, this drawback may be cancelled out by other social bene-
fits, particularly the expressive value of a civil protest against controversial 
judicial decisions or underlying laws, and of subsidizing activities that some of 
the public deems desirable. There is, however, a difference between expressing 
discontent with rules or judgments defining wrongdoing and actively trying to 
frustrate their application. In a liberal democracy, judgements or rules that 
seem undesirable can be altered through constitutionally acceptable means 
(such as legislative amendment or an appeal); otherwise, they must be respect-
ed. Thus, if a specific conduct is legally wrongful, a coherent legal system 
cannot encourage it. Although liability crowdfunding does not always encour-
age wrongdoing, it cannot be allowed when it does. 
A third criticism is that civil liability serves other goals than efficient de-
terrence, such as corrective justice, compensation of harm, or loss spreading. 
Liability crowdfunding does not frustrate any of these goals and, therefore, 
should not be limited. This argument has merit, but its weight depends on a 
much more fundamental debate about the goals of civil liability, which clearly 
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transcends the boundaries of this Article. To the extent that civil liability aims 
at efficient deterrence (whether or not exclusively), as many jurists and schol-
ars insist,217 liability crowdfunding must be cautiously scrutinized as explained 
above. Note further that in the rare cases where an award of damages is intend-
ed to achieve retributive justice (most notably under the rubric of “punitive 
damages”),218 liability crowdfunding must be categorically prohibited irrespec-
tive of its ex ante probability. Retributive justice requires that the wrongdoer 
suffer in proportion to the gravity of the wrong,219 and relieving the wrongdoer 
of the burden annuls his or her suffering and thwarts proportionality.220 
The fourth possible criticism is that prohibiting crowdfunding will not 
prevent unwarranted fundraising but only shift it from designated online plat-
forms to other unregulated mechanisms. The defendant’s family, friends, col-
leagues, and congregation members can be called upon to help by phone or e-
mail, at public events, or through social networks. This, too, is a legitimate 
concern. However, crowdfunding platforms dramatically increase the frequen-
cy and probability of success of liability funding campaigns, making the prob-
lem more acute. Technology enables the fundraiser to easily and inexpensively 
reach numerous individuals, including complete strangers, geographically and 
socially remote from the parties and the incident. A broader audience increases 
the likelihood that a sufficiently large pool of donors will be accessed, and a 
sizeable pool of contributors reduces the extent of the average contribution and 
induces potential donors to actually make a donation. More importantly, if oth-
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er liability funding methods raise similar under-deterrence concerns, they 
should also be regulated. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article is the first to systematically analyze civil litigation crowd-
funding from a law and economics perspective. Part I provided the necessary 
background for the theoretical inquiry. It explained that the risk of failure and 
the need to bear significant costs during a dispute resolution process might dis-
courage meritorious claims or defenses. Two contemporary models in the 
world of finance—TPF on the one hand and crowdfunding on the other—very 
recently combined to form an innovative and promising paradigm: civil litiga-
tion crowdfunding. The potential legal obstacles to this development seem ob-
solete. 
The key to the theoretical analysis of litigation crowdfunding is the dis-
tinction between investment-based and non-investment-based models. Ac-
knowledging the similarities between investment-based crowdfunding and 
TPF, Part II drew on existing literature on the latter to evaluate the former. In-
vestment-based litigation crowdfunding offers considerable benefits, particu-
larly the enhancement of access to justice, and most of the problems it might 
bring about are manageable. Indeed, the cohort of contributors is large, di-
verse, and case-specific, and each has a minor stake in the outcome. Conse-
quently, their ability and willingness to inspect claims and defenses prior to 
investment are limited. However, they are still profit-seeking players, who pre-
fer investment opportunities with the highest possible expected value. The le-
gal system can and should facilitate rational and informed investment by re-
quiring fundraisers to disclose relevant information. In addition, crowdfunding 
platforms have incentives to assume the screening functions that are carried 
out by the funder in ordinary TPF. They have an incentive to list only suffi-
ciently strong claims, because failing to do so will result in unsuccessful in-
vestments, deter investors, and reduce revenue. They also have the capacity, as 
aggregators of considerable capital, to conduct due diligence. 
Part III discussed non-investment-based litigation crowdfunding, starting 
with process costs. TPF, and to a more limited extent, investment-based crowd-
funding, involve reasonable assessment of each funding application. In non-
investment-based models, no party has a sufficiently strong incentive to estab-
lish and implement reasonable screening processes. Contributors who pledge 
relatively modest amounts and do not pursue financial gain are not particularly 
concerned about the expected value of the claim (or the defense). Furthermore, 
the crowdfunding platform has only a meager incentive to vet applications be-
cause it makes a profit whenever a funding goal is reached, irrespective of the 
case outcome. It does not need to credibly demonstrate its willingness and ca-
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pacity to filter out weak claims or defenses in order to attract future invest-
ments. To overcome this problem the law must require professional vetting of 
claims and defenses. Turning to outcome costs, Part III concluded that crowd-
funding should be prohibited, at least when its ex ante probability is sufficient-
ly high, because unconditionally relieving the defendant of the burden of lia-
bility might undermine one of the primary goals of civil liability: efficient de-
terrence. 
This Article has focused on direct litigation crowdfunding, whereby the 
platform serves as the sole intermediary between a party to a legal dispute and 
those offering financial support. Yet civil litigation crowdfunding is a nascent 
phenomenon, likely to develop in new directions. Specifically, market forces 
may push for indirect litigation crowdfunding. For example, litigation funding 
companies and law firms may seek equity- or debt-crowdfunding, and non-
profit legal advocacy organizations may seek donation-based crowdfunding. 
These and other—possibly unforeseeable—developments will surely require 
modification and extension of the basic theoretical framework. The Article 
thus paves the way for further research on emerging topics at the intersection 
of technology, law, and economics. 
  
 
